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Consensus building in a group is a hallmark of animal
societies, yet little is known about its underlying
computational and neural mechanisms. Here, we
applied a computational framework to behavioral
and fMRI data from human participants performing
a consensus decision-making task with up to
five other participants. We found that participants
reached consensus decisions through integrating
their own preferences with information about the
majority group members’ prior choices, as well as in-
ferences about how much each option was stuck to
by the other people. These distinct decision variables
were separately encoded in distinct brain areas—the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, posterior superior
temporal sulcus/temporoparietal junction, and intra-
parietal sulcus—and were integrated in the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex. Our findings provide sup-
port for a theoretical account inwhich collective deci-
sions are made through integrating multiple types of
inference about oneself, others, and environments,
processed in distinct brain modules.
INTRODUCTION
In our daily life, we build consensus with other people in order to
make collective decisions (Kerr and Tindale, 2004; Krause and
Ruxton, 2002; Sumpter, 2010). This type of consensus deci-
sion-making has been widely observed in social animals from
insects to primates (Conradt and Roper, 2005). Examples
include nest-site selection in swarms of honey bees (Seeley
and Visscher, 2004), coherent movement of individuals in
schools of fish (Ward et al., 2011), collective choices of travel
route in flocks of migrating birds (Black, 1988), and jury systems
in humans (Devine et al., 2001). As the French philosopher the
Marquis de Condorcet suggested (McLean, 1994), consensus
decision-making can offer various advantages, such as a reduc-
tion of risk from predators and an enhancement of decision
accuracy (Bahrami et al., 2010; Ioannou et al., 2012; Krauseet al., 2010; Ward et al., 2011). Consensus formation is hence
fundamental in human and animal social behavior.
Given its importance, consensus decision-making has been of
considerable interest to many fields. Traditionally, social psy-
chologists have studied mock juries (Davis et al., 1976), and
economists have pursued theoretical aspects (Arrow, 1963). In
biology, while researchers have primarily focused on cases of
eusocial insects, recent studies have begun to investigate verte-
brate animals (Conradt and Roper, 2005). However, it still re-
mains unclear how consensus arises from interactions between
human group members. Critically, no study to date in either an-
imals or humans has examined the underlying neural mecha-
nisms (Raafat et al., 2009).
Here, by combining behavior and fMRI with a computational
model, we provide an account of consensus decision-making
and its neural implementation. Ourmodel stands on the following
three hypotheses about key factors necessary for guiding deci-
sions. The first hypothesis is that an individual’s decision-making
is guided by that individual’s own preferences. The second is
that there is a tendency to follow the majority’s choice during
consensus formation. These hypotheses are motivated by the
results of classical human behavioral studies using mock juries
(Davis et al., 1976), as well as recent findings in vertebrate animal
studies (Sumpter and Pratt, 2009; Ward et al., 2011). The third
hypothesis is based on recent findings in decision neuroscience
that our brain is capable of inferences about hidden structures of
the environment, including mental states of other people (Dayan
and Daw, 2008; Yoshida et al., 2010). In the context of
consensus formation with other people, we hypothesize that it
is possible to infer others’ preferences for each of the available
options, or in other words, the ‘‘stickiness’’ of the options (i.e.,
how much each option was stuck to by the other people).
In the remainder of this paper, following the short description
of our experimental task, we test the above hypotheses by sim-
ple model-free analyses; then we show that our model can well
capture human behavior in a process of consensus formation;
and finally we reveal the underlying neural mechanisms.
RESULTS
Experimental Design
To validate the computational model and examine its neural un-
derpinnings, we developed an experimental paradigm in whichNeuron 86, 591–602, April 22, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 591
Figure 1. Experimental Task
(A) Illustration of the experimental setting. One participant inside the MRI scanner interacts with other participants. They try to build consensus on a choice
between two items.
(B) Timeline of one trial. On each trial, participants choose between two items (Decision), and the item chosen is then highlighted by a gray frame. After a waiting
time for the others’ choices and a jittered delay (ISI), the other participants’ choices are indicated by red dots (Outcome). Notably, participants are not able to
identify each of the others; they were informed only about the distribution of the red dots (i.e., the number of others choosing each of the two items). If they reach a
consensus, they move to the next block; otherwise, they again made a choice between the same items on the next trial in the same block. RT, reaction time; ISI,
interstimulus interval; ITI, intertrial interval.
(C) Overall timeline of the experiment. The experiment consists of 40 blocks: 20 six-person blocks involving six participants (M = 6) and 20 four-person blocks
involving four participants (M = 4). In each block, themaximumnumber of trials is determined randomly. Once participants reach a consensus, the remaining trials
in the blocks are skipped and they move to the next block (e.g., block 1). If they do not build a consensus before the end of the block (e.g., block 3), they move to
the next block and have no possibility to obtain any items for that block.one participant was scanned with fMRI (20 participants were
scanned in total), while interacting with five other participants
outside the scanner (Figure 1A; see Experimental Procedures
for details). In this experiment, the group was asked to come
to a unanimous consensus on a choice between two everyday
items (Figure 1B). The experiment consisted of 40 blocks of trials
(Figure 1C). Each block was associated with a unique pair of
items, and on each trial in a block every participant in the group
made a choice between those two items (Figure 1B). If the group
reached a unanimous consensus on a trial, they obtained the
item and moved to the next block; otherwise they moved to592 Neuron 86, 591–602, April 22, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.the next trial in the same block and made another choice be-
tween the same pair of items (Figures 1B and 1C). If they did
not reach consensus before the end of the block, they did not
get anything and moved to the next block (e.g., block 3 in Fig-
ure 1C). As the maximum number of trials in each block was
determined randomly, participants could not exploit the informa-
tion about the number of trials left in the block. Notably, we
measured participants’ preference for each item beforehand
by using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschack (BDM) auction (Becker
et al., 1964; Chib et al., 2009) (see Figures S1A and S1B and
Experimental Procedures for details).
Figure 2. Behavioral Results
(A) Histogram of the number of trials in each
block (mean ± SEM across participants; n =
20). Consensus block, participants reached a
consensus; no-consensus block, participants
failed to reach a consensus.
(B) Participants’ choices on the first trial in each
block. Probabilities of choosing the item presented
at the left side of the screen are shown (mean ±
SEM across participants). A filled circle denotes
the probability when the left item was preferred by
the participant, P(choice = L j L = preferred), and an
open circle represents the probability when the item was not preferred, P(choice = L j L = non-preferred). The circles overlap the error bars.
(C) Participants’ choices on the second and later trials in each block. Probabilities of choosing the left item are plotted as a function of percentages of the group
members who chose the item on the previous trial (mean ± SEM across participants). As in (B), filled and open circles denote the probabilities when the left item
was preferred and when the item was not preferred, respectively.In addition to the main experiment, we conducted a control
experiment in which participants were asked to build a
consensus with a computer algorithm (see Experimental Proce-
dures), to examine whether or not the behavior and neural
activity observed in the main experiment were dedicated to
social inferences about other people (Carter et al., 2012;
Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Mitchell, 2008; Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003). The computer algorithm was designed to mimic human
participants’ actual tendency to follow the majority and
to simulate the reaction times in the main experiment (Fig-
ure S1C). Here, it is worth noting that different sets of partici-
pants took part in the control and the main experiment. We
employed this between-participants design, instead of the
within-participants designs used in previous studies on this
issue (Delgado et al., 2005; Gallagher et al., 2002; Sanfey
et al., 2003), so as to prevent cross-contamination of task set
between the two experiments (e.g., attributing agency to the
computer algorithms).
Moreover, to explore possible effects of group size, in half of
the 40 blocks all six of the participants (one scanned and five
not scanned, six-person block) were engaged; while four partic-
ipants (one scanned and three not scanned selected randomly
from the five, four-person block) were involved in the other half
of the blocks (Figure 1C). However, as no significant effect of
group size was found in the main analyses, we pool together re-
sults from the two group sizes, unless specifically mentioned
otherwise.
In the main experiment, the behaviors of the scanned (n = 20)
and the not-scanned participants (n = 100) were highly consis-
tent with each other, and we therefore report only the scanned
participants’ data in the main text (see Figure S2 for the not-
scanned participants’ data).
Group-Level Overall Behavior in the Main Experiment
Participants quickly reached a consensus in most of the blocks.
The success rate of the consensus was 0.94 ± 0.01 (mean ±
SEM), and the consensus formation required fewer than five tri-
als in 77.37% ± 2.21% of the 40 blocks (Figure 2A). On the other
hand, in some blocks, they had a hard time building a consensus.
The number of trials in a block was equal to or greater than ten in
10.63% ± 1.45% of the blocks (Figure 2A), and they failed to
reach a consensus in 6.38% ± 1.06% of the blocks (Figure 2A,
open bar).Individual Behavior in the Main Experiment: Effect of
Participants’ Own Preference and Group Members’
Prior Choice
We hypothesized that participants’ choices would be guided by
their own preference for each item and the groupmembers’ prior
choices. Consistent with this, on the first trial in each block, par-
ticipants were more likely to choose their preferred item. The
probability of choosing the item presented at the left side of
the screen was greater when the item was preferred by the
participant, compared with when the left item was nonpreferred
(p < 0.01, two-tailed t test; Figure 2B). Furthermore, within each
participant, the probability of choosing the preferred item was
significantly greater than 0.5 (p < 0.05, two-tailed binomial test)
in 19 out of the 20 participants.
On the second and later trials, participants took into account
the groupmembers’ prior choice, as well as their own preference
(Figure 2C). The probability of choosing the left item was modu-
lated by the participant’s preference and the percentage of
group members’ who had chosen that item on the previous trial
(ANOVA, p < 0.01 for the preference effect, p < 0.01 for the group
members’ prior choice effect, p = 0.26 for their interaction; Fig-
ure 2C). The positive effect of the group members’ prior choice
indicates that participants tended to follow the majority as well
as to choose their preferred item.
Individual Behavior in the Main Experiment: Effect of
Hidden Stickiness of the Items
We further hypothesized that participants tracked a hidden var-
iable, the ‘‘stickiness’’ of the two items, which potentially reflects
other participants’ preference. In other words, participants’ own
choices would bemodulated by howmuch the other participants
tended to stick to their choice of one or other of the items as the
round progressed.
We assume participants inferred the stickiness by a simple
Bayesian learning algorithm (see Figure 3A for the graphical
description of the inference, and Supplemental Experimental
Procedures for details). In the formulation of the inference, the
stickiness reflects the other group members’ relative preference
for the item (i.e., positive values denote that they prefer that item
to the other item, and negative values indicate the opposite). Es-
timates of the stickiness are updated based on the belief that the
others’ choices on the current trial, Y, were generated by the
group members’ choices on the previous trial,G, and the hiddenNeuron 86, 591–602, April 22, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 593
Figure 3. Computational Model
(A) Graphical description of the inference about the hidden stickiness of the items. The Bayesian learner infers the hidden stickiness,S, based on the belief that the
others’ current choices, Y, are generated by the stickiness, S, and the groupmembers’ prior choice,G. Dashed circle, a hidden variable; solid circles, observable
variables.
(B) Example block. Three participants continue to choose the blue item, while the other one chooses the red.
(C) Estimated stickiness of each item in the example block (B). Top, from a viewpoint of participant #1; bottom, from a viewpoint of participant #4; same for (D)
and (E).
(D) Group members’ prior choice in the example block. Proportions of group members who chose each item on the previous trial are plotted.
(E) Participants’ own preference for each item in the example block. Participant #1 prefers the blue item to the red, while participant #4 has the opposite
preference.
(F) Across-participants correlation between the decision weight for the stickiness and the tendency to change their default behavior in later trials (tR 4). The
decision weight was estimated using the best-fitting model in (G). The partial correlation coefficient controlling for the decision weights of the other variables was
significantly positive (r = 0.72, p < 0.01).
(G) Computational models fit to participants’ choices. Each bar denotes BIC of eachmodel. BIC, Bayesian information criterion (smaller values indicate better fit).stickiness of each item, S. This assumption about the partici-
pants’ belief is reasonable, given that the stickiness reflected
the others’ preferences, and as shown in the previous section
(Figure 2C) participants’ choices were actually guided by their
own preference and the group members’ prior choice. That is,
they updated their estimate of the hidden variable S from the
observable variables Y andGwhen they got a new piece of infor-
mation about Y at the outcome phase (Figure 1B).
For example, suppose that in a block, one minority participant
continues to choose one item, say, red, and that themajority par-
ticipants choose the other item, say, blue (Figure 3B). In this
case, the majority participants estimate stickiness of the red
item as high (Figure 3C, top), because the minority’s choice of
the red cannot be attributed to conforming to a majority. On
the other hand, from a viewpoint of the minority participant, all
of the others choose the blue item, and none of them choose
the red. The stickiness of the blue is therefore judged as high
(Figure 3C, bottom). Notably, at the outcome phase of the first
trial, the estimated stickiness is updated always in favor of the594 Neuron 86, 591–602, April 22, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.item chosen by the majority (i.e., the blue item; see Figure 3C)
whether the participant is in the majority side or in the minority
side. This is because there is no information about the group
members’ prior choice on the first trial; and so only the others’
current choice governs an update of the stickiness.
This learning algorithm has two important properties. First, a
trial-by-trial signal of the estimated stickiness was not highly
correlated with the other two decision variables: the participant’s
own preference (mean correlation coefficient r = 0.11 ± 0.04)
and the percentage of group members who chose each item
on the previous trial (mean r = 0.35 ± 0.08), making it possible
to identify neural activity related to each of the three variables
(see Figure S3A and the section of neural results for further
analyses and discussion). We plot the time course of the three
variables in the example block (Figures 3C–3E).
Second, the estimation of the stickiness guided participants’
decisions on whether to change their behavioral strategy when
they had a hard time reaching a consensus (i.e., later trials in a
block). Again, consider the example in Figure 3B. If participants’
choices are positively modulated by the estimated stickiness,
the majority participants would change their behavior from blue
to red in later trials (Figure 3C, top), and the minority participant
would also change his/her behavior from red to blue (Figure 3C,
bottom). Conversely, in the presence of a negative modulation of
stickiness, they would not change their behavior (Figure 3C).
Thus, the behavioral effect of the estimated stickiness captures
the participants’ tendency to change their default behavior in
later trials. Indeed, we found a significant correlation between
the tendency to change behavior and the decision weight of
our stickiness variable across participants (Figure 3F, partial cor-
relation after controlling for the effect of the other two decision
variables, r0 = 0.72, p < 0.01, two-tailed; also see Figures S3B
and S3C for distributions of each decision weight and the cross-
correlations across participants). The relation remained signifi-
cant when we assessed it based on a conventional correlation
coefficient not controlling for the effect of the other variables
(r = 0.68. p < 0.01, two-tailed).
Individual Behavior in the Main Experiment:
Computational Model Fits
To ascertain contributions of the estimated stickiness to partici-
pants’ decision-making, we fit various computational models to
the participants’ actual choice data and compared their good-
ness of fits (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures for de-
tails).We first constructed a full model inwhich the decision value
of each item was computed as a weighted sum of the three
computational variables: the participants’ own preference for
the item, percentage of the group members who had chosen
the item on the previous trial, and estimated stickiness of the
item. We then considered alternative partial models that include
only one or two of the three decision variables. In the behavioral
model fitting procedure, a hierarchical modeling approach was
employed to reduce the estimation noise in the parameter esti-
mates (Daw, 2011) (Figure S4A; Supplemental Experimental
Procedures). Furthermore, each model’s goodness of fit was
assessed by Bayesian information criterion (BIC), which penal-
izes additional free parameters.
The model comparison revealed that our full model provided
the best fit to the participants’ actual choices than the other alter-
native models (Figure 3G; comparison against the second-best
model, Bayes factor > 150; p < 0.01, likelihood ratio test),
suggesting that their decision-making was guided by their own
preference, the group members’ prior choice, and the estimated
stickiness of the items. This conclusion did not change if we
applied the same model-fitting analysis to the data for early
and late blocks separately (Figure S4C). Furthermore, we
analyzed the data in the four-person and the six-person blocks
separately, and confirmed that the full model best fit both block
types (Figure S4D). This result implies that the three decision
variables guide the participants’ behavior independent of group
size.
We also tested several variations of these models. The vari-
ants include a model suggested by a theoretical study (Couzin
et al., 2005) in which the behavioral weight of the group mem-
bers’ prior choice was modulated by trial-by-trial feedback.
None of these alternative models outperformed the original full
model (Figure S4C). Finally, for further confirmation, we fit themodels to each participant’s choice data individually (Fig-
ure S4B; c.f., hierarchical modeling approach) and compared
the goodness of fits by using Bayesian model selection (Stephan
et al., 2009). The result obtained was consistent with those
based on the hierarchical modeling approach (Figure S4E).
These complementary analyses together support the notion
that participants’ decision-making was modulated by their own
preference, the group members’ prior choice, and the estimated
stickiness.
We also examined the possibilities that participants employed
more complicated strategies and that their preferences for each
item were altered during the experiment. The results of these
additional analyses confirmed that these factors do not appear
to be playing a major role in explaining participants’ choice
behavior (see additional behavioral analyses in Supplemental
Experimental Procedures and Figures S1D–S1G).
Individual Behavior in the Control Experiment
In the control experiment where each participant interacted with
a computer algorithm, we found the same qualitative result. That
is, the full model provided the best fit to the participants’ choice
data (Figure S4). This suggests that even in the nonsocial exper-
iment, as well as in the main social experiment, participants’
choices were guided by the three computational variables: their
own preference, group members’ (computer algorithms’) prior
choice, and the estimated stickiness of the items.
Neural Signals Encoding Participants’ Own Preference
We next analyzed the fMRI data to test for brain regions tracking
the key computational variables identified in the behavioral
analyses, by regressing these variables against the BOLD signal
across the whole brain (see Experimental Procedures and
Figure S3A). The regression analysis was performed by SPM8
without serial orthogonalization of parametric modulators.
Based on previous findings, we predicted that participants’
preference for each item would correlate with activity in the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) independently of social
or nonsocial contexts (Chib et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2010; Strait
et al., 2014). We analyzed the data in the main and the control
experiment together, and consistent with our hypothesis, we
found that the BOLD signal in the vmPFC at the time of decision
was significantly correlated with the participants’ preference for
the chosen item (Figure 4A, p < 0.05 small-volume corrected).
A closer examination of an independently identified ROI in the
vmPFC (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures) revealed
that the effect of preference on the neural activity was significant
on the first trial in each block, but not in the second and later trials
(Figure 4B), while behaviorally the preference guided the partic-
ipants’ choices also in the later trials (Figure 2C). One account for
this result could be ‘‘repetition suppression,’’ in that the neural
response is attenuated by repetition of the same computation
or the presentation of the same item within a block, which is
often accompanied by performance improvements such as a
decrease in reaction time (Grill-Spector et al., 2006). An alterna-
tive explanation is that participants had a lapse in concentration
or were bored by making a decision between the same items
repeatedly, which might result in increased reaction time. To
test these two alternatives, we compared reaction times on theNeuron 86, 591–602, April 22, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 595
Figure 4. Neural Correlates of Participants’ Own Preference
(A) Activity in the vmPFC significantly correlatedwith preference for the chosen item at the time of decision. The vmPFC activationmap is thresholded at p < 0.005
uncorrected for display purpose.
(B) Effect sizes of the preference in the independently identified vmPFC ROI. The effect sizes are plotted separately for the first, the second, and the later trials in
each block (mean ± SEM across participants; n = 40). **p < 0.01, and n.s., nonsignificant as p > 0.05. Inset, activated voxels in response to the preference on the
first trial (p < 0.005 uncorrected). vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
(C) Effect sizes of the preference in the vmPFC ROI for the main and the control experiment. Left, the main experiment (n = 20); right, the control experiment
(n = 20). The format is the same as in (B).first trial with those on the second and later trials in each block.
The comparison showed a significant decrease in log reaction
time (p < 0.01, two-tailed t test), consistent with the repetition
suppression account.
vmPFC activity exhibited the same pattern when we analyzed
the data for the main and the control experiment separately (Fig-
ure 4C). Indeed, a two-way ANOVA on the vmPFC activity re-
vealed no significant effect of experimental type (main versus
control, p = 0.85), group size (four versus six-person, p = 0.89)
or their interaction (p = 0.40). Moreover, no significant difference
was found in activity in this region between the two experiments
in a direct statistical comparison (even at p > 0.005 uncorrected).
Neural Signals Encoding Group Members’ Prior Choice
In the main social experiment, the second key computational
variable, group members’ prior choice, was correlated with ac-
tivity in the right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and
the adjacent area, temporoparietal junction (TPJ). We found at
the time of decision a significant correlation between the BOLD
signal in the right pSTS/TPJ and the percentage of group mem-
bers who had previously selected the item that was chosen by
the participant on the current trial (Figure 5A, p < 0.05 whole-
brain corrected at cluster level; see Table S1 for other activated
areas, including the central sulcus). Furthermore, as a robust-
ness check, we confirmed that the right pSTS/TPJ activity
remained significant (p < 0.05 corrected) when the relevant re-
gressor variable was orthogonalized against the other two key
computational variables (i.e., the participant’s own preference
and the estimated stickiness), so that those other variables sub-
sumed all of the common variance. The right pSTS/TPJ activity
also remained significant (p < 0.05 corrected) even when we
included the following decision-irrelevant variables into our
regression analysis as regressors of no interest: overall motiva-
tion (sum of the preference values for the two items), cognitive
load (log reaction time), and motor response (1 for choosing
the left item, 0 for the right).
On the other hand, in the control nonsocial experiment, we did
not find the right pSTS/TPJ activity to be significantly correlated596 Neuron 86, 591–602, April 22, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.with the group members’ prior choice at our whole-brain cor-
rected significance threshold (Figure 5B; see Table S1 for a list
of activated areas, including the left central sulcus). Furthermore,
a direct comparison of the whole-brain activation maps between
the two experiments revealed a significantly greater effect of the
group members’ prior choice on the pSTS/TPJ activity in the
main experiment (Figure 5C, p < 0.05, small-volume corrected).
This differential effect was also shown in an independent ROI
analysis (Figure 5D): the effect was significantly positive only in
the main experiment (p < 0.01, one-tailed), and the effect was
significantly greater in the main experiment compared with the
control experiment (p < 0.05, two-tailed). Consistent with this,
using a two-way ANOVA on the pSTS/TPJ activity, we found a
significant main effect of experimental type (main versus control,
p = 0.03); but no effect of group size (four- versus six-person,
p = 0.38) or their interaction (p = 0.40). These results together
demonstrate that pSTS/TPJ encoded group members’ prior
choice selectively only in the main social experiment.
Importantly, such differential activity cannot be attributed to a
difference in the behavioral effect of the group members’ prior
choice or to the characteristics of the participants. There was no
significant difference between the two experiments in the behav-
ioral weight of the group members’ prior choice estimated by the
model fitting (Figure S3D, p > 0.4, two-tailed). Also, participants in
the control experiment matched those who were scanned in the
main experiment in many aspects, such as age, sex, education
level, income level, IQ, hunger-rating score, and self-reported
sociality scales (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
It is also worth noting that activity in the left-central sulcus was
found to be significant in both the main and the control experi-
ments (Table S1). This activity, however, vanished when we
included decision-irrelevant regressors described above in the
regression analyses. Combining this finding with prior evidence
about the central sulcus implicated in primary motor/sensor pro-
cessing, we speculate the activation reflected a basic sensori-
motor process, not directly related to decision-making, such
as pressing a key in the keypad or perceiving information about
red dots (Figure 1B; Experimental Procedures).
Figure 5. Neural Correlates of the Group Members’ Prior Choice
(A) Main experiment: activity in the right pSTS/TPJ at the time of decision significantly correlated with the percentage of group members who had previously
selected the item that was chosen by the participant on the current trial. The map is thresholded at p < 0.005 uncorrected for display purpose.
(B) Control experiment: no activity in the right pSTS/TPJ significantly correlated.
(C) Main versus control experiments: activity in the right pSTS/TPJ significantly better correlated in the main experiment.
(D) Effect sizes of the group members’ prior choice in the independently identified right pSTS/TPJ ROI for the main and the control experiment (mean ± SEM
across participants; n = 20). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, and n.s., nonsignificant as p > 0.05. pSTS, posterior superior temporal sulcus; TPJ, temporoparietal junction.Neural Signals Encoding Estimated Stickiness
The third variable, estimated stickiness of the chosen item, was
significantly correlated with the BOLD signal in the bilateral intra-
parietal sulcus (IPS) at the time of decision in the main experi-
ment (Figure 6A, p < 0.05 whole-brain corrected at cluster level;
see Table S2 for other activated areas). The bilateral IPS activa-
tions survived (p < 0.05 corrected), even when the regressor
value of the stickiness was orthogonalized to the other two vari-
ables, and even when decision-irrelevant potential confounds
(see above) were included in the regression analysis as regres-
sors of no interest.
In the control experiment, the whole-brain analysis revealed
the BOLD signal in the right IPS to be significantly correlated
with the estimated stickiness (Figure 6B, p < 0.05 whole-brain
corrected at cluster level). Although we did not detect a signifi-
cant effect in the left IPS under our statistical threshold for the
whole-brain analysis, an independent ROI analysis showed a
significant effect also in the left IPS (Figure 6C, left; p < 0.05,
one-tailed). Furthermore, the ROI analysis demonstrated no sig-
nificant difference between the two experiments in the effect size
of the estimated stickiness in either the right (Figure 6C, right; p >
0.3, two-tailed) or the left IPS (Figure 6C, left; p > 0.4, two-tailed).
We also confirmed, by a two-way ANOVA, that there was no
significant effect of experimental type (main versus control, p =
0.46), group size (four- versus six-person, p = 0.08) or their inter-
action (p = 0.53) on the bilateral IPS activity. Consistent with this,
in the whole-brain direct comparison between the two experi-
ments, we did not find any significantly differential activities in
the right or left IPS (p > 0.005, uncorrected). Taken together,
neural activity in bilateral IPS was modulated by the estimated
stickiness of the chosen item in both the main and the control
experiment, suggesting that the IPS tracked the computational
variable irrespective of social or nonsocial contexts.
Neural Integration of the Decision Variables
Computationally, the three key variables need to be integrated in
order to enable an overall decision about whether or not to
choose a given item. We tested for brain regions implicated in
the integration process during the main social experiment. To
this end, we reasoned that if a region is engaged in the integra-tion, the region must (1) encode the integrated choice probability
assigned by the computational model to the participant’s chosen
item and (2) have functional connectivity with regions tracking
each of the individual key decision variables (i.e., vmPFC, right
pSTS/TPJ and bilateral IPS) at the time of decision.
When including the modeled choice probability, orthogonal-
ized to the other three variables, into the fMRI regression analysis
(see Supplemental Experimental Procedures), we found that a
region of rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC), as well as a re-
gion of dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) extending into the
adjacent presupplementary motor areas, satisfies the first crite-
rion. That is, BOLD signal in the rACC and the dACC significantly
correlated with the modeled choice probability (Figure 7A, p <
0.05, whole-brain corrected at cluster level). Next, to test for
the second criterion, we conducted a connectivity analysis, psy-
chophysiological interaction (PPI). The PPI analysis examined
whether each of the three seed regions, the vmPFC, the right
pSTS/TPJ, and the bilateral IPS signaling the three variables,
respectively, had increased connectivity at the time of decision
with the two regions encoding the choice probability (see Sup-
plemental Experimental Procedures). Results of the analysis
showed a significant increase in the functional connectivity be-
tween the three seed regions and the dACC at the time of deci-
sion (Figure 7B). On the other hand, we did not find significant
modulation in the connectivity between rACC and the right TPJ
or the bilateral IPS (Figure 7C).
These results together indicate that only the dACC satisfies
both of the two criteria, supporting the notion that the three
key computational variables involved in consensus decision-
making are integrated in dACC.
DISCUSSION
This study provides insight into the computational and neural
mechanisms underlying group consensus formation. The pre-
sent findings go beyond results from other tasks in social neuro-
science that have hitherto focused on dyadic interactions, and
have hence not been designed to address the neural or compu-
tational mechanisms underlying decision-making in groups
(Behrens et al., 2009; Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Lee, 2008).Neuron 86, 591–602, April 22, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 597
Figure 6. Neural Correlates of the Estimated Stickiness
(A) Main experiment: activity in the bilateral IPS significantly correlated with the estimated stickiness of the chosen item at the time of decision. The map is
thresholded at p < 0.005 uncorrected for display purpose.
(B) Control experiment: activity in the right IPS significantly correlated with the estimated stickiness of the chosen item.
(C) Effect sizes of the stickiness in the independently identified IPS ROIs for the main and the control experiment. R. IPS, right intraparietal sulcus; L. IPS, left
intraparietal sulcus. The format is the same as in Figure 5D.Using model-based fMRI, we elucidated a role for several
computational variables in human consensus decision-making,
as well as determining how those variables are encoded at the
neural level. Participants’ choices were guided by their own pref-
erences, the group members’ prior choices, and the estimated
stickiness of the items. These variables were each encoded in
distinct brain structures, with vmPFC representing the partici-
pant’s own preference, pSTS/TPJ tracking the group members’
prior choice, and IPS tracking the stickiness. Furthermore, func-
tional connectivity analysis combined with additional model-
based fMRI analysis revealed that these computational signals
were integrated in dACC, demonstrating not only what computa-
tions were implemented in individual brain regions but also how
those computations were combined to drive consensus deci-
sion-making.
Stimulus Valuation Signals in the vmPFC
As expected, participants were more likely to choose their
preferred item in our task. Further, an individual’s preference
for each item was represented in the vmPFC irrespective of so-
cial or nonsocial contex, consistent with prior evidence impli-
cating vmPFC in the valuation of many types of goods at the
time of decision-making (Chib et al., 2009; Levy and Glimcher,
2011; Tom et al., 2007). Here we show that valuation signals in
the vmPFC are present even during complex group decision-
making.
We further found that value signals in the vmPFC were atten-
uated by repeated choices between the same items, in a manner
consistent with repetition suppression (Grill-Spector et al., 2006).
Given ambiguity in the precise physiological mechanism under-
lying repetition suppression, we cannot completely exclude
other accounts for this effect, such as the possibility that activity
decreases in vmPFC relate to a transition to amore habitual form
of behavioral control (Daw et al., 2005).
Computations Pertaining to an Inference about Group
Behavior in the pSTS/TPJ
Participants took into account the choice tendencies of the
group participants when making their own choices (Figure 2C):
they were likely to choose a particular item when the majority598 Neuron 86, 591–602, April 22, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.of the group members had chosen the item on the previous trial.
A key computational variable underpinning this behavior is a rep-
resentation of the percentage of the group members who had
previously selected the item. This variable was found to be en-
coded in the right pSTS/TPJ (Figure 5A), areas previously impli-
cated in mentalizing (Frith and Frith, 2003; Gallagher and Frith,
2003; Saxe, 2010). Recent studies using formal mathematical
models (Behrens et al., 2009; Dunne and O’Doherty, 2013)
have demonstrated that pSTS/TPJ encodes learning signals
for the prediction of other people’s behavior, such as prediction
error about the influence of one’s own action on the opponent’s
next move (Hampton et al., 2008), others’ intentions (Behrens
et al., 2008; Suzuki et al., 2012), and others’ expertise (Boorman
et al., 2013). The present finding that pSTS/TPJ tracked group
members’ prior choice at the time of decision suggests this re-
gion plays a pivotal computational role not only in learning and
updating but also in encoding information necessary for guiding
choices in a social context.
Is the pSTS/TPJ specifically recruited for social cognition? The
issue of domain specificity of this region has spurred heated
debates in social neuroscience (Mitchell, 2008; Saxe, 2010),
with some studies reporting evidence for social specificity (Cor-
icelli andNagel, 2009; Rilling et al., 2004; Carter et al., 2012; Saxe
and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe, 2010), while others have reported
evidence for domain generality (Mitchell, 2008). In the current
study, consistent with the social-specificity hypothesis, we
found that the pSTS/TPJ selectively represented group mem-
bers’ prior choice in the main social experiment, but not in the
control nonsocial experiment, even though this control experi-
ment was matched in every other way to the main experiment
except for the social component. Different sets of participants
took part in the two experiments, and therefore crosscontamina-
tion of task set was unlikely to occur. It is thus likely that differen-
tial activity in the pSTS/TPJ between the tasks emerged naturally
because of how the tasks were framed. We can thus conclude
that the right pSTS/TPJ does indeed have socially specific con-
tributions, at least with regard to the computations required for
consensus decision-making.
There is a large body of cross-species work from insects to
primates showing that an individual’s probability of choosing a
Figure 7. Neural Correlates of the Inte-
grated Signal in the Main Experiment
(A) Activity in the dACC and the rACC at the time of
decision significantly correlated with the choice
probability assigned by the computational model
to the participant’s choice. The map is thresholded
at p < 0.005 uncorrected for display purpose.
dACC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; rACC,
rostral ACC.
(B) Functional connectivity between the dACC and
the other regions at the time of decision. Effect
sizes of the PPI regressors in the dACC ROI are
plotted (mean ± SEM across participants; n = 20). **p < 0.01, and *p < 0.05. vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; pSTS/TPJ, right posterior superior
temporal sulcus and temporoparietal junction; IPS, bilateral intraparietal sulcus. PPI, psychophysiological interaction.
(C) Functional connectivity between the rACC and the other regions at the time of decision. The format is the same as in (B). n.s., nonsignificant as p > 0.05.particular option increases as a function of the number of
conspecifics already choosing the option (Halloy et al., 2007;
Sumpter, 2010;Ward et al., 2011; Sueur et al., 2010). Despite
behavioral concordance across species, to our knowledge little
is known about the neural mechanisms underlying group
consensus formation in animals. An interesting avenue for future
research would be to examine the degree of homology of neural
encoding for group members’ prior choice in the brains of hu-
mans and other social animals such as nonhuman primates.
Signals Tracking a Hidden Structure of the Environment
in the IPS
Participants tracked the stickiness of the presented items
during consensus formation, suggesting that they did not simply
respond to their own preference or groupmembers’ prior choice,
but also tracked and utilized the hidden structure of the environ-
ment. The stickiness indicates howmuch each itemwas stuck to
by the other group members, which potentially reflects the
others’ preference for the item. Computationally, the stickiness
was estimated by a Bayesian learning algorithm that took into
account the degree to which others conform to the majority’s
choice (Figure 3A). The estimated stickiness guided participants’
decisions on whether to change their behavioral strategy when
they had a hard time reaching a consensus (Figures 3B, 3C,
and 3F). One interesting question for future theoretical studies
is if and how the inference about the hidden structure of the envi-
ronment facilitates or suppresses the consensus formation.
The estimated stickiness for the chosen item was encoded in
the bilateral IPS and the adjacent inferior parietal lobule (IPL).
Because the IPS/IPL activation was present both in the main so-
cial and the control nonsocial experiment (in contrast to the so-
cial-specific pSTS/TPJ activity), our findings suggest that neural
computations in the IPS/IPL are domain general. Note that it is
unlikely that the domain-general activation pattern results from
participants in the control experiment assuming that they were
playing against a human-like agent. Different sets of participants
took part in the main and the control experiments (so as to pre-
vent crosscontamination of task set between the two experi-
ments), and in the instruction for the control experiment we did
not use any suggestion of human-likeness in the computer algo-
rithms; e.g., a part of the instruction was ‘‘You will get the item if
all the red dots are located below the image of the item you
choose’’ (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Never-theless, the bilateral IPS/IPL was recruited in both the main
and the control experiments.
The IPS/IPL has previously been implicated in evidence accu-
mulation of both sensory (Gold and Shadlen, 2007) and value in-
formation (Sugrue et al., 2005) in monkeys and humans (Shadlen
and Newsome, 2001; Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Sugrue et al.,
2004; Hare et al., 2011; Heekeren et al., 2004). Recent studies
have also implicated this region in learning about the abstract
structure of the environment, in a manner not necessarily related
to sensory or value information directly, such as in updating
state transitions (Gla¨scher et al., 2010) or when encoding the
probability of events (d’Acremont et al., 2013). Taken together,
these findings and ours suggest that the bilateral IPS/IPL could
be involved in facilitating inference about environmental struc-
ture in a domain-general manner.
Integration of the Three Computational Signals
Finally, we demonstrated that the three key computational vari-
ableswe identified are integrated in dACC to compute the choice
probability of each item. While regions of dACC and rACC both
tracked the choice probability, the dACC, but not the rACC,
had connectivity with other regions encoding each of the three
key computational variables.
The present results are broadly consistent with studies on sim-
ple decision-making, suggesting that the valuation of goals and
stimuli in vmPFC provides input for the computation of action
value in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex including dACC before
finally being transformed to a motor command in motor cortex
(Hare et al., 2011; Rangel andClithero, 2013). This view is consis-
tent with the strong anatomical connections between dmPFC
and motor-related areas (Beckmann et al., 2009). Other studies
on foraging or decision-making requiring cost-benefit consider-
ation have reported results consistent with value integration at
the action-value level in dACC (Kolling et al., 2012; Wallis and
Rushworth, 2013).
In a social context, several studies have suggested that
vmPFC plays a pivotal role in value integration by employing sim-
ple experimental tasks, which do not involve actual interactions
with other people, such as learning from social information, de-
cision-making on behalf of others, valuation of social stimuli, or
charitable giving (Behrens et al., 2008; Hare et al., 2010; Janow-
ski et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2014). However, no study to date has
addressed how value integration occurs for decision-making inNeuron 86, 591–602, April 22, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 599
real social strategic interactions (c.f. van den Bos et al. [2013] for
integration ofmultiplex learning signals). Our finding provides ev-
idence for value integration during social interactions, and sup-
ports the notion that multiple types of information are integrated
at the level of action values in dACC, thereby providing mecha-
nistic insights into the neural computations underlying social
decision-making.
To conclude, in this study we provide a theoretical account
of human consensus decision-making by identifying a key role
for three distinct computational processes. This framework is
further validated empirically by the finding that these variables
are separately encoded in three distinct brain systems. More
broadly, our findings provide direct evidence that multiple types
of inference about oneself, others, and the environments are
processed in parallel and integrated in our brain to guide
decision-making in a social context. Moving beyond the dyadic
interactions that have already been extensively studied in social
neuroscience (Behrens et al., 2009; Fehr and Camerer, 2007;
Lee, 2008), the present study suggests the importance of
examining decision-making in larger group contexts in order to
gain broader insight into the nature of human social intelligence
(Krause et al., 2010).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
We provide a comprehensive description of the methods in the Supplemental
Experimental Procedures.
Participants
In our main experiment, 120 healthy, normal volunteers participated. Twenty
out of the 120 participants were scanned with fMRI while they performed an
experimental task. The remaining 100 participants were engaged in the
same task outside the MRI scanner. A control experiment involved scanning
20 additional volunteers with fMRI who did not participate in the main experi-
ment. The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Califor-
nia Institute of Technology.
Experimental Tasks
Participants performed three tasks: prescanning BDM auction task,
consensus decision-making task, and postscanning BDM auction task.
Pre- and Postscanning BDM Auction Task
Wemeasured participants’ preference for each of the 40 items by using a BDM
auction (Becker et al., 1964).
Consensus Decision-Making Task
In the main experiment, each participant tried to build a consensus with other
participants on a choice between two items (Figure 1A). The task consisted of
40 blocks of trials (Figures 1B and 1C): 20 six-person and 20 four-person
blocks.
In each block of trials, participants simultaneously chose between two items
repeatedly until they reached a consensus, i.e., choosing the same item (Fig-
ures 1B and 1C). If they reached a consensus on a trial, they got the item and
moved to the next block; otherwise, they moved to the next trial in the same
block and made another choice between the same pair of the items. If they
did not reach consensus before the end of the block, they did not get anything
and moved to the next block (e.g., block 3 in Figure 1C). In the next block, par-
ticipants made choices between a different pair of the items repeatedly, again,
until they reached a consensus. Pairs of items were pseudorandomly assigned
so that the same pair was never presented again. Importantly, the maximum
number of trials in each block was not instructed to participants, and in actu-
ality was determined stochastically.
At the beginning of each trial, each participant was asked to make a choice
between the pair of items by pressing a buttonwith their right handwith no time
constraint (decision phase; Figure 1B). The chosen itemwas immediately high-600 Neuron 86, 591–602, April 22, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.lighted by a gray frame, initiating the interstimulus interval (ISI) phase. After a
waiting time for the other group members’ decisions and a jittered interval
(1.5–4.5 s), the others’ choices were revealed to the participant via placement
of red dots under the chosen items (outcome phase, 2 s). Notably, participants
were not able to identify each of the other group members; they were informed
only about the distribution of the red dots (i.e., the number of participants
choosing each of the two items). If all the dots were located below the image
of the item the participant had chosen, i.e., consensus, the participant was
informed that she/he obtained the item (instruction phase, 3 s) and moved to
the next block after the jittered ITI (2–6 s). Otherwise, decision phase on the
next trial in the same block was initiated following the ITI.
The control experiment was almost the same as the main experiment,
except that each participant tried to build a consensus with a computer
algorithm instead of with other human participants. The computer algorithm
to determine the location of each red dot was designed to mimic the not-
scanned participants’ actual choice behavior in the main experiment, in terms
both of the tendency to follow the majority’s choice and reaction times
(Figure S1C).
Computational Models
To determine the key computational variables involved in consensus decision-
making, we constructed a family of computational models and fit thosemodels
to the participants’ actual choice behaviors.
fMRI Data Analysis
We used SPM8 for image processing and statistical analysis. A separate gen-
eral linear model (GLM) was defined for each participant. The GLM contained
parametric regressors representing the three key computational variables at
the trial onset (Figure 1B): the participant’s preference for the chosen item,
the percentage of group members who had previously selected the item that
was chosen by the participant on the current trial, and the estimated stickiness
of the chosen item.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes four figures, two tables, and Supplemental
Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article at http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.neuron.2015.03.019.
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